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INDUCEMENT AND GROKSTER:
GUARDING AGAINST THE PITFALLS OF
COPYRIGHT OWNERS' NEW WEAPON
INTRODUCTION
This Note provides a discussion of the legal landscape surrounding
the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster)'
case, where the Supreme Court found that distributors of peer-to-peer
file sharing software could be liable according to a new theory of in-
ducing infringement of copyright. This new theory, taken from patent
law, allows defendants to be liable for the infringing acts of third par-
ties where there is "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken"
showing an intent to induce infringement by third parties.2 The Court,
in what may be a decision narrowly tailored to the facts of the case,
found sufficient evidence of that intent, and remanded the case to the
lower court for a ruling according to this new theory.3 But because
the Court adopted the theory through an analogy to patent law, it
becomes necessary to analyze how courts have applied this patent law
doctrine and what issues might confront courts trying to interpret the
Grokster opinion in future copyright cases.
In making its decision, the Court passed on the chance to address
the copyright owners' urges to reconsider the Court's holding in Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., which granted protec-
tion to product distributors where their goods had "substantial nonin-
fringing uses."'4 Because that protection remains, courts must
interpret and apply the Grokster opinion in a way that does not in-
fringe upon Sony's safe harbor.5 In doing so, courts may need to
choose a side on the issue of the necessary intent for inducement,
where recent authorities have acknowledged a "lack of clarity."16
Part II of this Note will provide an overview of how the law regard-
ing secondary liability and peer-to-peer file sharing developed before
1. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). The full
history of the case is: 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), affd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004), vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
2. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
3. Id. at 2781-83.
4. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
5. See infra notes 213-257 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 213-257 and accompanying text.
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the Court's opinion in Grokster.7 The discussion will summarize the
first attempts at applying the Sony doctrine to peer-to-peer software
and will be followed by an examination of the Grokster opinion in
light of this past precedent in Part 111.8 After examining the opinion,
Part IV will analyze the evidence that the Court found indicative of
intent to induce infringement. 9 This discussion will include a compari-
son to approaches taken by courts applying the Grokster opinion.' 0
Finally, Part V of this Note will look to patent law, where the Court
borrowed the theory of inducing infringement, to discuss issues that
may confront courts when applying this new theory of liability.1 Part
V will address a relevant conflict in recent Federal Circuit cases and
endorse a sliding scale approach as a potential solution.12 Finally, Part
VI will summarize the findings of this Note and provide a framework
of the challenges facing courts charged with interpreting the Supreme
Court's opinion in Grokster.13
II. BACKGROUND
This Part discusses the basics of secondary liability in copyright law,
as well as the cases that set the stage for the issues presented to the
Court in Grokster.14 The discussion will begin with an overview of the
applicable copyright law and a discussion of the Sony case in which
the Supreme Court first applied the law to technology.' 5 Then, this
Part will examine the first application of the Sony ruling to peer-to-
peer software in A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. (Napster).16 Finally,
this Part will discuss the alternate interpretation of Sony provided by
the Seventh Circuit in In re Aimster Copyright Litigation.17
A. Overview of Secondary Liability. in Copyright Law
Copyright law is derived from a constitutional mandate and is en-
acted in a federal statute.' 8 Article I, section eight of the Constitution
7. See infra notes 14-88 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 49-88, 89-123 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 128-161 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 162-184 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 190-257 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 213-257 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 258-263 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 18-88 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 18-48 and accompanying text.
16. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see infra notes 49-80
and accompanying text.
17. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); see infra notes 81-88 and
accompanying text.
18. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).
1310 [Vol. 55:1309
2006] INDUCEMENT AND GROKSTER 1311
gives Congress power over intellectual property in order to grant ex-
clusive rights to inventors and artists.1 9 Congress does not grant these
rights primarily for the benefit of the creator. Rather, copyright law
intends to promote the science and arts in order to provide a benefit
to the public.20 Personal gain for the inventor is a secondary con-
cern. 21 To serve these purposes, Congress gives a number of rights to
copyright owners.22
Violators can be liable for copyright infringement in both direct and
secondary fashions.23 Secondary theories of liability include. contribu-
tory liability, vicarious liability, and as this Note will later explain, in-
ducement liability. 24 The Copyright Act explicitly prohibits direct
infringement, 25 while the secondary theories have developed entirely
within the framework of judge-made law.26 Judge Posner described
this legal framework as necessary where enforcing copyrights against
third parties makes more sense than going after the direct infringers. 27
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To Promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ... .
20. See id.
21. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431-32 (1984) ("Creative work is
to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of pro-
moting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.") (quoting Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 106. This section provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 121, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; [and]
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly ....
Id.
23. See Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911).
24. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004); see infra notes 119-120, 128-161
and accompanying text.
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
26. While the Copyright Act does not mention or define secondary liability, some of the legis-
lative history indicates Congress's intent to endorse vicarious and contributory theories. See
Elizabeth Miles, In re Aimster & MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.: Peer-to-Peer and the Sony Doc-
trine, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 21, 22 n.5 (2004).
27. Posner analogized secondary liability for infringement to "inducing a breach of contract":
If a breach of contract (and a copyright license is just a type of contract) can be pre-
vented most effectively by actions taken by a third party, it makes sense to have a legal
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1309
Contributory liability developed as a way to hold defendants liable
for aiding or encouraging copyright infringement. 28 There are three
necessary elements: "(1) [D]irect infringement by a primary infringer,
(2) knowledge of the infringement, and (3) material contribution to
the infringement. ' 29 Knowledge, whether actual or constructive, is
present where a defendant either knows or should know of infringing
activity.30 A party can materially contribute if it provides the "site
and facilities" for copyright infringement. 31
Vicarious liability, an outgrowth of the common-law doctrine of re-
spondeat superior,32 is applied in a broader context within copyright
law.33 To establish a claim the plaintiff must satisfy three elements:
"(1) [D]irect infringement by a primary party, (2) a direct financial
benefit to the defendant, and (3) the right and ability to supervise the
infringers. '' 34 Vicarious liability differs from contributory liability in
that knowledge is not an element, but control and a strong interest are
required.35 The financial benefit gained need not be direct but can be
present where infringing use promotes business or attracts
customers.36
B. Applying Secondary Liability to Technology-
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.37
In the only prior Supreme Court decision to discuss the subject of
secondary liability and technology, the Court, in a five to four deci-
mechanism for placing liability for the consequences of the breach on him as well as on
the party that broke the contract.
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2003).
28. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 380 F.3d 1154, 1160
(9th Cir. 2004).
29. Id.
30. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439-42 (1984). Judge Posner
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Sony ruling. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649
("We therefore agree with Professor Goldstein that the Ninth Circuit erred in ... suggesting that
actual knowledge of specific infringing uses is a sufficient condition for deeming a facilitator a
contributory infringer.") (internal citation omitted).
31. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fo-
novisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)).
32. Id. (quoting Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262).
33. Grokster H, 380 F.3d at 1164. The court stressed the relationship between the defendant
and the direct infringer and stated that "[a] salient characteristic of that relationship often,
though not always, is a formal licensing agreement between the defendant and the direct in-
fringer." Id.
34. Id. (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022).
35. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
36. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023 ("Financial benefit exists where the availability of infringing
material 'acts as a draw for customers."') (quoting Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263-64).
37. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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sion, absolved VCR manufacturers of liability for the infringing activi-
ties of VCR owners after purchase. 38 In doing so, the Court reached
into the "staple article ... of commerce" doctrine. 39 This doctrine is
codified within the patent statutes, but analogous provisions are not
found anywhere in the Copyright Act.40 The doctrine, as applied in
patent law, protects the rights of other inventors by not allowing a
patent owner to allege infringement where another invention had
both infringing and noninfringing uses.41 Where an invention is capa-
ble of both, patent law absolves the inventor of contributory liabil-
ity. 42 The Sony Court extended this protection to the realm of
copyright law: "[T]he sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.
Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses."'43
The Court accepted the argument that the VCR's use as a "time-
shifter" was a substantial noninfringing use, and therefore absolved
defendants of liability-creating a new shield for defendants against
contributory infringement. 44
In coming to its decision, the Sony Court cast light onto the purpose
of copyright law within the framework of technological develop-
ment.45 The Court noted that copyright law has developed alongside
technology, and that Congress typically provides the necessary modifi-
cations.46 This symmetrical growth stems from a need to balance the
rights of free expression with the need for technological development
without slowing the advent of new and efficient methods of technolog-
ical dissemination.47 In light of this, the Sony Court advised courts to
refrain from expanding the reach of copyright law without the gui-
dance of Congress. 48
38. Id.
39. Id. at 440 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000)).
40. See id. The "staple article of commerce" exception is codified in the Patent Code. 35
U.S.C. § 271.
41. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439-43.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 442.
44. Id. Time-shifting is the act of recording a program in order to view it at a later time. Id. at
423. Plaintiffs offered two other uses: recording or copying programs in order to permanently
keep them and using recorded programs to allow fast-forwarding through commercials. Id. The
Court found both uses were infringing. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
45. Id. at 430-31.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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C. Applying Sony to Peer-to-Peer Software:
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 49
The first application of the Sony doctrine to peer-to-peer network-
ing came in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. Napster used a first-
generation, peer-to-peer networking structure that revolved around a
central indexing server.5 0  Each user, or client, that connects to the
network is a node.51 The central indexing server maintains a list of the
files available at each node, as well as the node's unique IP address.52
In order to facilitate this control, users must register each time they
log in so the system can update the directory of available files. 53 The
central server receives and processes all searches and commands, and
when a match occurs, the requesting client receives the IP address of
the corresponding host computer to facilitate a direct connection. 54
In Napster, the Ninth Circuit applied the staple article of commerce
shield to peer-to-peer networking and found the defendants liable
under both contributory and vicarious theories of liability.5 5 In so do-
ing, the court limited the substantial noninfringing use standard put
forth by the Sony Court and instead utilized it only as a test for the
knowledge element of contributory liability.5 6 Comparing Napster's
file sharing program to the VCRs in Sony, the court held that there
was no inference of knowledge simply because the software develop-
ers were aware that the software had infringing uses.57 Rather, the
49. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
50. See Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGrHTON L. REV. 859, 864-65 (2004).
51. Id. at 864.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. The advantage of this model is that the central index contains a comprehensive list of
all available files on the peer-to-peer network and thus searches quickly and efficiently to locate
requested files. Id. at 865. The simple structure results in relatively easy implementation for
network programmers. Feder, supra note 50, at 866. The downside is that the network depends
on the functionality of the central server and, therefore, outages of that server can cripple the
network and prevent users from being able to share files. Id. This deficiency led to the develop-
ment of newer and more decentralized peer-to-peer file-sharing methods. See Tim Wu, When
Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 726-36 (2003).
55. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001).
56. Id.
57. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated:
The Sony Court refused to hold the manufacturer and retailers of video tape record-
ers liable for contributory infringement despite evidence that such machines could be
and were used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrighted television shows.... The Sony Court
declined to impute the requisite level of knowledge where the defendants made and
sold equipment capable of both infringing and "substantial noninfringing uses."
Id. (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)).
1314 [Vol. 55:1309
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court held that Napster's actual knowledge of infringing activity made
Sony an ineffective defense. 58
The specific knowledge at issue arose from the index files on Nap-
ster's central server that listed numerous infringing files that were pre-
sent and available on the network.59 In addition, the defendants
served Napster with notices of infringing content and use on the Nap-
ster system. 60 In essence, the standard applied by the court was a two-
part rule: (1) where a product has substantial noninfringing uses, con-
structive knowledge will not be implied simply because the product's
design allows for infringing use; but, (2) the court may find liability
where there is evidence of actual and specific knowledge of infringing
use.
61
D. The Response to Napster: Peer-to-Peer Decentralization
The ruling in Napster sent a clear message to peer-to-peer software
developers: where you have control over the actions of your users, you
will be liable for those actions. 62 Developers responded by creating
network structures that eliminated that element of control.63 The re-
sult was a second generation of programs that differed in design from
Napster and utilized a decentralized architecture. 64 Under this new
system, indexing and searching functions are distributed across the
peer-to-peer network. 65 Rather than having a central server, individ-
ual PCs on the network each handle a portion of the work originally
assigned to the central indexing server in first generation systems. 66
58. Id. at 1021-22.
59. Id. at 1011-13.
60. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022 n.6 ("Plaintiff[s] ... demonstrate that defendant had actual
notice of direct infringement because the RIAA informed it of more than 12,000 infringing
files.") (quoting 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 918 (2000)) (alterations in original).
61. Id. at 1020-22.
62. See Wu, supra note 54, at 730.
63. Id. at 731.
64. Id. The open-source peer-to-peer file-sharing network Gnutella, of which Morpheus is an
example, employs this type of network architecture. For more discussion regarding the technical
specifics, see Feder, supra note 50, at 862-67. See also the Ninth Circuit's discussion in the
Grokster II opinion. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster II), 380
F.3d 1154, 1158-60 (9th Cir. 2004).
65. The result of this architectural change is that search queries must propagate through the
peer-to-peer network. On successful matches, the responding client sends notification of the
match back up the network chain to the original requesting user. When compared to the sim-
plicity of querying a central index in a Napster-like, first generation network, search queries in
second generation systems require significantly more time and network resources. The network
is considerably more reliable, however, as it is no longer dependant on the main central server.
See Feder, supra note 50, at 865-67.
66. Id.
2006] 1315
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Users download the client-side software onto their computer,67 and
the software handles the indexing and searching of locally held files on
the machine.68 It also relays search queries from other clients on the
peer-to-peer network. 69
Decentralization eliminates the control over peer-to-peer network
usage present in the Napster software.70 There is no central index;
rather, each individual computer maintains its own list of the files
available on the local machine. 71 This means that the software distrib-
utor has no knowledge over what files users offer to share on the net-
work.72 Because connections and file transfers are initiated directly
by users without the involvement of a central server, there is no easy
way for the distributor to determine the content of a transfer.73 Fur-
thermore, even if the distributor did maintain such control, it is doubt-
ful that it would have any control or ability to stop any infringing or
illegal use.74
Some developers pushed peer-to-peer software evolution even fur-
ther and implemented programs that combined elements from both
first and second generation structures. 75 Looking to combine the ben-
efits of both architectures while reducing their respective deficiencies,
software programmers developed a networking mechanism that was
only partially decentralized. 76 They accomplished this through the ad-
vent of the "supernode. ' ' 77 Rather than a main central indexing
67. Peer-to-peer file-sharing software is widely available on most online software repositories.
See, e.g., Download.com, http://www.download.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2006); Morpheus.com,
http://www.morpheus.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2006). Grokster previously offered its client
software for download on its website. Grokster.com, http://www.grokster.com (last visited Mar.
27, 2006). That site now displays a message that the Grokster software has been deemed illegal
by the Supreme Court and is no longer available. Id.; see infra note 159 and accompanying text.
68. See Feder, supra note 50, at 865.
69. As one website explains:
Example: on the basis that a peer is directly connected to eight other peers, each
query is first passed on to the eight peers, who disseminate the query on to the 64 peers
attached to them. When this is extrapolated, by the sixth iteration of this process one
single query will have reached 2,097,152 peers on the network.
CacheLogic, Understanding Peer-To-Peer: Filespace Sharing, Architecture and Protocol, http://
www.cachelogic.com/p2p/p2phistory.php (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
70. Cachelogic.com, Understanding Peer-to-Peer: Background and History, http://www.cache
logic.com/p2p/p2phistory.php. (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
71. Cachelogic.com, Understanding Peer-to-Peer: Architecture and Protocols, http://www.
cachelogic.com/p2p/p2punderstanding.php. (last visited Apr. 25, 2006).
72. See Feder, supra note 50, at 882-83.
73. Id.
74. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
75. An example of this system is FastTrack, which was developed by KaZaa and of which
Grokster is a descendent. Feder, supra note 50, at 865.
76. See id.
77. Id.
1316
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server, the system would contain an arbitrary amount of supernodes
that would share the functions of a central indexing server.78 These
systems reclaimed some of the computing efficiency lost when the
Napster decision forced developers away from the centralized
model.79 Nevertheless, the software provider could still shield itself
from liability by pointing to its lack of knowledge and control.80
E. The Seventh Circuit Tries to Open the Door to Liability:
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation
After the district court's Grokster ruling, but before the appeal, the
Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of liability against another distrib-
utor of peer-to-peer software in Aimster.81 As in Napster, the Seventh
Circuit ruled against the software distributor by affirming the district
court's grant of a preliminary injunction.82 In doing so, the court
adopted a broader interpretation of Sony.
The court in Aimster expanded the knowledge prong of contribu-
tory liability by holding that "when a supplier is offering a product or
service that has noninfringing as well as infringing uses, some estimate
of the respective magnitudes of these uses is necessary for a finding of
contributory infringement. ' '8 3 It failed to elaborate on just what the
results of that analysis need to be, instead holding that "the balancing
of costs and benefits is necessary only in a case in which substantial
noninfringing uses, present or prospective, are demonstrated. ' 84 This
was a further modification of the Sony ruling: a mere showing of po-
tential noninfringing uses is no longer enough-there must actually be
78. Id. at 865-67. Any computer connected to the network could act as a supemode provided
it met certain qualifications. Id. at 865 n.16. These supernodes created a backbone for the peer-
to-peer network that performed the functions of a first generation central server-they gathered
information regarding available files and relayed the search queries to the individual clients. Id.
at 865-67. The individual clients connected to the peer-to-peer network through one of these
supernodes. Feder, supra note 50, at 865-67. The result was a network that had faster searches
than a decentralized system but used far less network resources. Id. In addition, the system
maintained reliability since no certain amount of supernodes needed to be present and online for
the system to retain functionality. Id. See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd. (Grokster 11), 380 F.3d 1154, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2004).
79. See Wu. supra note 54, at 735-36.
80. Id. at 737-39.
81. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California first decided Grokster on
April 25, 2003. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster 1), 259 F. Supp.
2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Grokster 1 on August 19,
2004. Grokster If, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit decided Aimster on June
30, 2003. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
82. See Grokster 11, 380 F.3d at 1167.
83. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649.
84. Id. at 650.
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evidence such use occurs, and those uses should be weighed against
infringing uses.85 The court listed five possible noninfringing uses of
the Aimster software, and then pointed to the complete lack of evi-
dence in the record that any user of the program made use of it in any
of those ways.86 Absent that evidence, Sony was no help to Aimster.
The Aimster software, while unique in some ways, was still based
on a central index that provided knowledge of the actual content on
the system.87 Therefore, despite the new interpretation of Sony in
Aimster, it is likely the Napster court would have decided the case the
same way. The Morpheus and Grokster software, part of the second
generation movement that arose in a response to the Napster deci-
sion,88 would not be directly addressed until Grokster.
III. METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS, INC. V. GROKSTER,
LTD.
8 9
This Part of the Note examines the Supreme Court's decision in
Grokster.90 It will first discuss how the Court dealt with the central
issue of when a product distributor can be liable for the acts of its
users.91 That discussion will show how the Court chose not to apply
either the Seventh Circuit or the Ninth Circuit's proffered interpreta-
tions of the Court's ruling in Sony.92 Instead, the Court provided a
new reading of Sony's holding and gave copyright owners a new the-
ory upon which to seek liability-the inducing infringement of copy-
right theory.93 After reinterpreting Sony, the Court analyzed the
evidence on the record to determine if it was sufficient to survive sum-
mary judgment on this new ground of inducing infringement of copy-
right.94 This Part 'will discuss that analysis, focusing on the three
categories of evidence the Court pointed to as sufficient proof of in-
tent to induce.95
85. See id.
86. Id. at 652-53. The five potential uses were: (1) downloading non-copyrighted music, (2)
increasing the value of music as currency in an on-line community, (3) leading to the formation
of community groups and fan clubs that promoted music, (4) encouraging sincere communica-
tion protected by the software's encryption feature, and (5) obtaining access to music which the
user had previously purchased but not brought with him or her while traveling. Id.
87. Id. at 646-47.
88. See supra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
89. 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
90. See infra notes 96-123 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 103-123 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 109-123 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 124-184 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 124-184 and accompanying text.
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A. Facts and Procedural History
The case came to the Supreme Court on appeal from the Ninth Cir-
cuit, which had affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary
judgment to the defendants as to contributory and vicarious liability.96
The plaintiffs in the case owned or controlled most of the copyrighted
music and movies in the United States.97 'The defendants, Grokster
and StreamCast, were distributors of freely available peer-to-peer file
sharing programs. 98 The copyright owners alleged that roughly ninety
percent of the files shared between the users of these programs were
copyrighted and that seventy percent of the files belonged to the
plaintiffs.99 Indeed, the software distributors did not vigorously con-
test that most of their users exchanged files illegally.1°° The main is-
sue facing the Court was whether to affirm the Ninth Circuit's ruling
that Grokster and StreamCast were neither contributorily nor vicari-
ously liable for the infringement of their users because the structure of
the software each provided did not allow for the knowledge or control
necessary for liability.10 1 The Ninth Circuit achieved this result via its
interpretation of the Napster and Sony decisions, an interpretation the
Supreme Court overruled. 10 2
B. Reasoning
The Supreme Court began its opinion in much the same way as the
two previous courts, discussing the structure of the software each de-
fendant employed, reviewing the magnitude of infringement taking
place, and laying out each side's arguments.10 3 The Court then began
to discuss the particular evidence of StreamCast and Grokster's in-
volvement in the infringement, however, and it became clear that the
Court did not grant certiorari in order to let them off the hook.10 4 It
referred to the probable magnitude of infringing content as "stagger-
ing" and began laying the tracks for the new theory of liability-in-
ducing infringement of copyright. 10 5
96. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I1), 380 F.3d 1154
(9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 453 U.S. 1032 (2004).
97. Id. at 1158. The Grokster plaintiffs were most of the major motion picture studios and
record companies in the United States. Id. at 1158 n.1.
98. Id. at 1158.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1160; see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,
2782 (2005).
101. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 2770-72.
104. See id. at 2772.
105. Id.
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The Court's first step in doing so was to address the current inter-
pretation of its seminal ruling in Sony. The Court did not, as one
might expect, address any kind of circuit split on the issue between the
Ninth and Seventh Circuits. The Court's majority opinion cited Aim-
ster only once, and did not discuss Judge Posner's interpretation of
Sony.106 This could reflect the Court's belief that the two opinions are
reconcilable, and that no actual conflict existed. 10 7 More likely, the
Court felt that such a discussion was unwarranted because it intended
to decide the case on the theory of inducement, which branched away
from both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits' interpretations. In doing
so, the Court focused on the Ninth Circuit's ruling and its apparent
misreading of the Sony opinion. 10 8
The Court stated that the parties mischaracterized the argument in
the case as to what it means for a product to be "capable of commer-
cially significant noninfringing uses."10 9 Essentially, the parties were
battling over what showing of lawful uses was required for the Sony
shield to apply.110 The copyright owners felt that even if a product
was capable of noninfringing uses, consideration should be given to
the magnitude of such uses versus the magnitude of infringing uses.11'
Where the overwhelming use of the product is to infringe a copyright,
such as here where the estimate was ninety percent infringing use, the
Sony shield should not let the product distributor off the hook." 2 On
the other hand, the defendants felt that the rule in Sony was clear.
Where a product has significant noninfringing uses, courts can not
106. Id. at 2776 (citing In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2003)).
The Court instead cited to Aimster's discussion of the difficulties facing the plaintiffs should they
be cutoff from pursuing liability against the software distributors and forced to seek damages
from the direct infringers. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776.
107. It is arguably possible to reconcile the ruling in Aimster with the Ninth Circuit's rulings in
Napster and Grokster. Similar to the software in Napster but unlike the software in Grokster, the
central indexing servers employed by the Aimster defendants provided knowledge and control
over infringing use. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 646-47. The Grokster court held that where those
elements are absent, liability cannot be found. In addition, the Aimster defendant failed to pro-
duce any evidence of substantial noninfringing uses, in which case it was treated as if no such
uses existed. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. Of course, this is tempered by Sony's
holding that the product "need merely be capable of" such uses. Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
108. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778 ("We agree with MGM that the Court of Appeals misapplied
Sony, which it read as limiting secondary liability quite beyond the circumstances to which the
case applied.").
109. Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. 442 (1984)).
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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hold its distributor liable without "specific knowledge." 1 3 As the
Sony opinion says, the product "need merely be capable of [such]
uses."
114
The Supreme Court, in essence, said that both parties were wrong,
and that the Ninth Circuit limited the Sony ruling beyond the circum-
stances presented in that case.115 Sony did not state that significant
noninfringing uses will save a defendant from liability altogether. 116
Rather, it merely held that where a product is capable of such uses,
the defendant cannot be held liable based only on the design of the
product or on knowledge of infringing uses.117 Other theories of lia-
bility, such as actual intent to induce infringement, are fair game.118
The theory that the Court chose was the inducing infringement of cop-
yright, which it borrowed from patent law. 119 The Court stated that
regardless of the Sony holding, there can be liability when a device is
distributed "with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright,
as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement .... ,,120
What it did not decide, and what may later prove to be the more
important question, is exactly whether the Sony rule should be limited
to take into consideration the magnitude of infringing versus nonin-
fringing uses of a challenged product. 121 The justices left that question
for another day, although the concurring opinions in the case set the
113. Id. (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I1), 380
F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004)).
114. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
115. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
116. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778 ("This view of Sony, however, was error, converting the case
from one about liability resting on imputed intent to one about liability on any theory.").
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2779-80.
120. Id. at 2780.
121. The Court noted:
Because Sony did not displace other theories of secondary liability, and because we
find below that it was error to grant summary judgment to the companies on MGM's
inducement claim, we do not revisit Sony further, as MGM requests, to add a more
quantified description of the point of balance between protection and commerce when
liability rests solely on distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will occur. It is
enough to note that the Ninth Circuit's judgment rested on an erroneous understanding
of Sony and to leave further consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be
required.
Id. at 2778-79.
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stage for the argument. 122 Fittingly, the justices split on the issue,
three to three.123
IV. ANALYSIS
This Part delves into the Grokster opinion to examine further the
implications of the new theory of inducing infringement of copy-
right. 124 It will first examine the Court's analysis of the evidence
presented to it and what the Court now requires for inducement liabil-
ity.125 It will then consider the first application of the Grokster opin-
ion as an example of how courts will decide future inducement
cases.1 26 Finally, this Part will ask whether in this instance the Court,
by establishing this new theory and leaving the Sony shield issue for
later, took the correct approach.1 27
A. A New Weapon for Copyright Owners:
Inducing Infringement of Copyright
After the Court proffered its new interpretation of Sony, the issue
then became whether there was sufficient evidence that Grokster and
StreamCast, through "clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken," intended to induce infringement.1 2 The Court said there was
sufficient evidence, and pointed to three categories of proof which it
felt showed that "[t]he unlawful objective [was] unmistakable. '129
First, the court highlighted promotional materials and internal com-
munications showing that the defendants made an effort to emphasize
infringing capabilities of the software in question and to target a
known group of infringers. 130 Among this evidence, the Court
pointed to StreamCast's distribution of the "OpenNap" program,
which was compatible with Napster.131 StreamCast used the program
to distribute and advertise its own Morpheus software. 132 Also on the
122. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2783-87 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 2787-96 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
123. Justice Ginsburg argued for a modification of the Sony rule and was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. Id. at 2783-87 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice
Breyer, on the other hand, argued to affirm the Sony Rule and was joined by Justices Stevens
and O'Connor. Id. at 2787-96 (Breyer, J., concurring).
124. See infra notes 128-184 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 128-161 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 162-171 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 172-184 and accompanying text.
128. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
129. Id. at 2782.
130. Id. at 2772-73, 2781.
131. Id. at 2784.
132. Id.
1322 [Vol. 55:1309
INDUCEMENT AND GROKSTER
record were StreamCast's internal documents in which the defendant
frequently referenced Napster. 133 As for Grokster, the Court stated
that the company derived its name from Napster, and that Grokster
inserted metatags into its own webpage to divert search queries from
users looking for the Napster software. 134
Second, the Court pointed out the failure of both parties to make an
effort to eliminate or even reduce the infringing use of their prod-
ucts. 135 The Ninth Circuit had refused to hold this against the defend-
ants because the defendants had no independent duty to police its
users. 136 Although the Supreme Court did not disagree, it felt the fail-
ure to take such measures indicated an intent to facilitate
infringement. 137
Finally, the Court discussed the business models each party
adopted, which relied on streaming advertising and maximizing prod-
uct usage-usage that was inevitably infringing.138 The defendants
made money by displaying advertisements to those who used their
software. 139 As a result, the defendants' profits increased proportion-
ately with usage.' 40 In the Court's view, because the only high volume
use of the product was to steal copyrighted works, the defendants
were depending on use by infringers to turn a profit.141
The Court felt that the evidence before it showed an intent to in-
duce infringement that was "unmistakable. ' 142 Because the Court
ruled only on a motion for summary judgment, however, it will be up
to the lower courts to determine liability.143 An argument can cer-
tainly be made that the lower court should see things another way.
While the defendants may have targeted a "known group of infring-
ers" in the Napster user base, they also targeted what was, for all in-
tents and purposes at the time, the most significant group of peer-to-
peer file sharers. 144 The defendants may have wanted to lure in users
133. Id.
134. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2773, 2781. "Meta tags" are words placed within the source code
of a website and used by search engines to classify the site and direct search queries accordingly.
See Danny Sullivan, How to Use HTML Meta Tags, Dec. 5, 2002, http://www.searchenginewatch.
com/webmasters/article.php/34751_2167931.
135. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774, 2781.
136. Id. at 2781.
137. Id. -
138. Id. at 2773-74, 2781-82.
139. Id. at 2781-82.
140. Id. at 2782.
141. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2782.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2782-83.
144. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
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looking for free copyrighted works, or they may have simply been
looking for users who might download the defendants' software. Fur-
thermore, much of the evidence cited by the Court occurred near the
time Napster first came under fire, and well before its liability was
determined. 145 While the direct downloading of copyrighted works
was clearly illegal at the time, offering the software that facilitated
such acts was not.
The Court further complicated that issue when it pointed to evi-
dence of the defendants' failure to mitigate infringing use as indicative
of intent to induce. 146 The district court held Napster liable because
Napster had knowledge of infringing use and had an ability to control
that use, but failed to do so. 147 In Grokster, however, the lower courts
were willing to absolve both defendants because that control and
knowledge were absent. 148 But the Supreme Court used the same fail-
ure to act against the defendants under a new theory of liability.149
That theory is not codified and is borrowed from another body of
law. 150 Furthermore, both the Grokster defendants and other poten-
tial litigants watched as attempts to amend the Copyright Act in this
way failed. 151 When the lower courts, Congress, and the Supreme
145. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2772-73. The district court heard the Napster case in 2000, and
the Ninth Circuit addressed the appeal in 2001. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.
Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
146. See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
151. The bill, Senate Resolution 2560, was introduced during the second session of the 108th
Congress. Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004). It was
sponsored by Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah. See id. The bill died in the Senate in 2004. See Bill
Rosenblatt, Induce Act Dead for This Year, Oct. 14, 2004, http://www.drmwatch.com/legal/arti-
cle.php/3421731. The introductory remarks accompanying the bill showed a clear intent on the
part of the legislators to address the legal landscape surrounding the Grokster case and the issue
of peer-to-peer file sharing. Id. The bill attempted to do exactly what the Court did in Grok-
ster-establish a new offense of inducing infringement of copyright. See 150 CONG. REC. S7190
(daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch). The bill proposed amending the Copyright
Act by providing additional language at the end of § 501, the text of which would have read as
follows:
(g)(1) In this subsection, the term "intentionally induces" means intentionally aids,
abets, induces, or procures, and intent may be shown by acts from which a reasonable
person would find intent to induce infringement based upon all relevant information
about such acts then reasonably available to the actor, including whether the activity
relies on infringement for its commercial viability.
(2) Whoever intentionally induces any violation identified in subsection (a) shall be
liable as an infringer.
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall enlarge or diminish the doctrines of vicarious and
contributory liability for copyright infringement or require any court to unjustly with-
hold or impose any secondary liability for copyright infringement.
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Court all have different views on the legality of Grokster's actions,
can those actions really indicate an unlawful intent? The Court's ex-
planation is that the evidence indicates liability only when taken in
"'context."152
The Court's willingness to hold the defendants' business model
against them is also particularly troubling, especially when hordes of
software and online content providers employ the same ad-supported
business model.153 As a common revenue strategy, the defendants
likely would have used advertising within their respective products re-
gardless of their intent to attract infringing or noninfringing users.
Furthermore, the Court seems to presume that every Napster user the
defendants attracted would use the new software only to steal copy-
righted works. If the defendants can show a belief that those users
would also look for the occasional public domain work, or perhaps
come across and download such works while using the software, then
there is certainly an argument that the defendants' business model did
not depend on infringing use.
The Court's decision in Grokster does not make explicitly clear
what is required for inducement liability, providing the aforemen-
tioned evidence only as examples. The Court was quick to point out
that none of these types of evidence is sufficient standing alone.154
Instead, the Court stated that the evidence on the record was enough
S. 2560, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004). The proponents of the bill stated that it would provide the
legislative "guidance" explicitly asked for by the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REc. S7192
(daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., (Grokster 11), 380 F.3d 1154, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2004). The Supreme
Court apparently felt it unnecessary to wait for that guidance, creating the new theory of liability
on its own, despite indications that Congress would resume the fight in the new session. See
Ted Bridis, Senate Talks Fail on File-Sharing Software, Oct. 7, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/
6200562/.
152. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
153. Often called "adware," advertising is commonly used in software to allow the creators to
recover development costs or to distribute the software for free. See Wikipedia-The Free On-
line Encyclopedia, Adware, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilAdware (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
Advertising in online services has, however, become a viable source of revenue. For example,
Microsoft is turning to online advertising to support a number of new online services in its Win-
dows Live software line. Ciaran Buckley, Microsoft Relies on Ad Sales for New Venture, Nov. 2,
2005, http://www.electricnews.net/frontpage/news-9651373.html. According to one estimate, in-
ternet advertising revenue for 2005 could have been as much as twelve billion dollars. Ciara
O'Brien, E-Advertising Is Booming, Says Report, Nov. 22, 2005, http://www.electricnews.net/
frontpage/news-9654523.html.
154. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2781 n.12 (2005).
The Court noted:
Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find
contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to
prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of substantial noninfringing
uses. Such a holding would tread too close to the Sony safe harbor.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
to survive summary judgment only when taken together and in con-
text. 155 This is fitting, because the Court pointed to the evidence as
indicative of intent, as opposed to stressing the actual conduct itself.1 5
6
Much of the promotional materials considered may have never been
made public, and the noted internal communications were surely
not.157 It is not certain whether a court could find a "clear expression"
of intent to induce without affirmative steps taken beyond the mere
selling of a product. The Court suggests that such a holding, however,
would trump the Sony shield.158
But the Court's wording seems to indicate its belief that the lower
court should find liability for inducement in this instance. Perhaps
foreseeing its demise, Grokster has already settled and shut down its
software. 159 Whether the dispute survives until the lower court recon-
siders it on remand remains to be seen, 160 but if so, the Court's analy-
sis of the available evidence is likely to be strongly influential.
Indeed, the first district court case interpreting the Court's ruling mir-
rors the approach.'61
B. Grokster's First Descendent. Monotype Imaging, Inc.
v. Bitstream, Inc.
The first attempt at applying the Court's opinion in Grokster came
in Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., where Judge St. Eve held
that there was insufficient evidence of the defendant's intent to induce
infringement of copyright.' 62 Judge St. Eve noted the evidence in the
case against the defendant, and compared it against the three catego-
ries of evidence outlined by the Supreme Court in Grokster.163
Id. The Court also noted that "[t]his evidence alone would not justify an inference of unlawful
intent, but viewed in the context of the entire record its import is clear." Id. at 2782 (referring to
the evidence of Grokster and StreamCast's business models).
155. Id. at 2782.
156. See id. at 2773 n.7 ("The record makes clear that StreamCast developed these promo-
tional materials but not whether it released them to the public. Even if these advertisements
were not released to the public and do not show encouragement to infringe, they illuminate
StreamCast's purposes.").
157. Id.
158. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2781 n.12.
159. See Ted Bridis, Grokster File-Sharing Service to Shut Down, Pay $50 Million, AUGUSTA
CHRONICLE, Nov. 8, 2005, C08. Grokster agreed to pay fifty million dollars and to stop distribut-
ing its software. Id.
160. As of April 7, 2006, settlement negotiations were dead, and StreamCast, the remaining
defendant, intended to take the case to court. See Alex Viega, StreamCast to Seek Trial in Copy-
right Case, Apr. 7, 2006, available at http://abcnews.go.com.
161. See infra notes 162-171 and accompanying text.
162. 376 F. Supp. 2d 877 (N.D. I1. 2005).
163. Id. at 888-89.
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Initially, the court noted that the defendant advertised its software
by hailing its ability to work with any type of font, presumably includ-
ing those protected by copyright, without infringing on any intellec-
tual property rights. 164 The plaintiffs attempted to argue that this was
analogous to targeting infringers as the Grokster defendants did with
the former Napster user-base. 165 The court rejected this contention,
finding that Bitstream only intended to promote its software's ability
to work with non-Bitstream fonts rather than to encourage
infringement. 166
After making this determination, the court went on to note that the
defendants had taken steps to avoid the use of its software with fonts
owned and protected by other companies.1 67 Finally, the court held
that the defendant's business model was not similar to those of the
Grokster defendants. 68 There was no evidence that the defendant
benefited from the use of its software with other companies' fonts,
whether that use was infringing or noninfringing. 169 Rather, it ap-
peared that the defendant distributed the software with its own fonts
in order to increase its own sales. 170
The case, as a first example of how lower courts will interpret the
Grokster opinion, is encouraging in that Judge St. Eve took the
Court's lead and looked beyond the evidence of conduct in an attempt
to deduce the actual intent of the actor. Furthermore, she did so in
light of what appears to be a similar situation to that in Grokster, one
where users implemented the provided software in both infringing and
noninfringing fashions. As this Note will discuss further, it will be im-
portant for courts to look for actual intent of inducement, as opposed
to imputing that intent from the surrounding circumstances. 71
C. Right Answer at the Right Time?
A definitive answer Grokster is not, but it does do two things. It
seemingly ends the prolonged dispute between these specific parties,
and it gives copyright owners another weapon to use to defend their
rights against infringement. While the more important question is left
for another day, the Court gives strong indications that it does intend
164. Id. at 888.
165. Id. at 889.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Monotype Imaging, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 888-89.
169. Id. at 889.
170. Id.
171. See infra notes 213-257 and accompanying text.
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to answer it eventually. 172 In the mean time, perhaps the Court's rul-
ing was appropriate, establishing a status quo of sorts and giving more
time for the pertinent issues presented to develop. 173
As for peer-to-peer software, this decision alone seems unlikely to
provide the deterrent the copyright owners were hoping to get. The
Court effectively embraced the prevalent argument that the defend-
ants in this case should be liable because it was obvious what they
were trying to do.174 There is still no holding that software used in
overwhelming fashion to steal copyrighted works is itself illegal to dis-
tribute. As Justice Breyer points out, the Court is not saying that the
technology itself conflicts with copyright laws, and thus the opinion is
likely to have a direct effect on only the named defendants. 175 The
message sent to software distributors is essentially this: If you intend
to pass out software that facilitates copyright infringement, do not
make obvious any hope to benefit from that infringement. In fact, the
Grokster decision may help other peer-to-peer software providers de-
velop strategies to avoid liability. In the future, software distributors
will likely take affirmative steps to avoid similar paper trails, such as
seeking opinion letters regarding advertisements or posting disclaim-
ers against infringing use. 176 Of the three types of evidence the Court
noted against the defendants, it was the evidence of blatant targeting
of Napster users that ultimately did in StreamCast and Grokster. The
Court specifically said that failure to prevent infringement or a sus-
pect business model alone would tread too close to the Sony shield
and not give rise to liability. 177
For that reason, for copyright owners' new method of attack to
carry any weight, it is likely that copyright owners will urge courts to
avoid a rigid adoption of the Court's evidentiary categorizations. 178
172. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2778-79 (2005)
("It is enough to note that the Ninth Circuit's judgment rested on an erroneous understanding of
Sony and to leave further consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be required.").
See also id. at 2783-96 (concurring opinions arguing for and against modification of the Sony
rule).
173. See id. at 2793-96 (Breyer, J., concurring).
174. Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 42-43, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grok-
ster, Ltd. (Grokster 11), 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-55894, 03-55901), 2003 WL
22753806.
175. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2793-96 (Breyer, J., concurring).
176. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Daddy, Are We There Yet? Lost in Grokster-Land, 9
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 75, 94-95 (2006). Professor Zimmerman proposes a "toothless
tiger" scenario, where Grokster could serve as "a teaching manual for future iterations of Nap-
ster/Grokster on how to avoid liability .... " Id. at 94.
177. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
178. In Monotype Imaging, the first case to apply the Grokster decision, the plaintiff proffered
evidence analogizing Bitstream to the Grokster defendants and lost. Monotype Imaging, Inc. v.
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Grokster and StreamCast both emerged on the peer-to-peer scene rel-
atively early, and they came into the picture as a result of the fall of
the clear king of online file-sharing, Napster.179 The "known group"
of infringers that the defendants targeted was in essence the only
group of infringers, because at the time virtually everyone was using
Napster. 180 Had that not been the case, it is unlikely that either Grok-
ster or StreamCast would have wasted time designing software in-
tended to foster compatibility with the Napster client. Today's
internet users have any number of file-sharing programs from which
to choose, and those programs facilitate the sharing of virtually any
type of media.'81 Is there any group of infringers within those prod-
ucts distinct enough to be a "known group" to be targeted? Is a
known group of infringers simply internet users who like music?
D. Looking to Patent Law
This question foreshadows what is likely to occur-courts will break
away from the Supreme Court's approach and perform individual
analyses of presented evidence in order to assess the intent of the de-
fendant. Because the Court adopted the theory of inducing infringe-
ment that is codified within patent law,182 courts are likely to look to
the Federal Circuit and its interpretation of the doctrine when analyz-
ing evidence against defendants in copyright cases. In addition, courts
may look to Grokster for help in addressing inducement in patent
cases as well.183 That would be good news to all litigants, if we were to
presume that courts have reduced a statute in existence since 1952 to a
set of clear rules and applications. 184 Sadly, this is not the case, and
one specific split within the Federal Circuit may seep into the realm of
Bitstream, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 2005). See supra notes 162-171 and accompanying
text.
179. Napster estimated that at one time it had as many as fifty-seven million users. See Sam
Costello, Webnoize Reports Napster Downloads Drop 36 Percent in April, May 1, 2001, http://
www.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml/Ol/05/01/Ol050lhnnapster.html?p=br&s=8.
180. One analyst explained in 2001 that Napster could achieve market dominance because
there were no viable alternatives. See id. No other system had the same-sized user base or
offered the same amount of files. Id.
181. See Wikipedia-The Free Encyclopedia, Peer-to-Peer, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-
to-peer (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
182. See infra notes 190-191 and accompanying text.
183. That appears to already be the case. See MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi
Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Aventis Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs,
Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 490 (D.N.J. 2006).
184. The law of inducing infringement was codified in the Patent Act in 1952; it has existed in
some form within the common law for much longer. See Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent In-
fringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 225, 227 & nn.7-8 (2005).
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copyright law and prove problematic to future applications of the
Court's holding in Grokster.
V. IMPACT
This Part will look to current applications of the inducement doc-
trine in patent law as a potential guide for how courts will apply the
Grokster decision and what issues might arise. 18 5 It will consider two
important questions: (1) what conduct constitutes inducement, and (2)
what intent is necessary for inducement. 186 The latter discussion will
include talk of a current split within the Federal Circuit over what
intent is required. 187 By considering these issues, this Part will discuss
potential pitfalls facing courts interpreting the Grokster opinion.188
As a possible solution to the inconsistencies within the Federal Cir-
cuit, as well as a way of addressing the different ways of reading the
Grokster opinion, this Part will endorse Professor Lemley's sliding
scale approach to inducement liability.189
A. Inducement Primer
The law of inducing patent infringement states that "[w]hoever ac-
tively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an in-
fringer." 190 As a matter of law, there must first be direct infringement
before there can be liability for inducing infringement. 191 The statu-
tory definition of inducing infringement, while simple, leaves a num-
ber of unresolved legal issues which have borne themselves out within
the case law. The two most prominent issues are: (1) what types of
conduct constitutes inducement, and (2) what intent must a defendant
have to be liable for inducing infringement.
185. See infra notes 190-257 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 190-241 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 213-254 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 213-254 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 255-257 and accompanying text.
190. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000).
191. NTP, Inc. v.- Res. in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Dynacore Hold-
ings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Indirect infringement,
whether inducement to infringe or contributory infringement, can only arise in the presence of
direct infringement, though the direct infringer is typically someone other than the defendant
accused of indirect infringement."); Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d
1022, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 2002); McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., No. CIV S-02-
2669 FCDKJM, slip op., 2005 WL 2346919, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2005).
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1. When Does a Party Induce Infringement?
The majority of cases finding defendants liable for inducement in-
volve some sort of active encouragement of third-party direct infringe-
ment. Much like the Supreme Court did in Grokster, these cases look
for conduct that involves advertising infringing capabilities to buyers
or instructing customers on infringing uses of products.192 In fact, the
Grokster Court stated that "[t]he classic instance of inducement is by
advertisement or solicitation that broadcasts a message designed to
stimulate others to commit violations. ' 193 A recent copyright induce-
ment case indicates that courts will look for similar conduct in copy-
right infringement cases as they do in patent infringement cases. In
AMC Technology, L. L. C. v. SAP AG, the court held that by distribut-
ing a "Component Upgrade Guide," the defendant was inducing its
customers to copy the plaintiff's copyrighted software code. 194
Other types of conduct could give rise to liability as well. For in-
stance, some courts have applied inducement as a type of vicarious
liability, holding defendants liable in instances of control over employ-
ees.195 In addition, where the direct infringers are suppliers or manu-
facturers, courts have found individuals who make business decisions
that led to infringement liable.196
Courts seem more likely to impose liability, however, where de-
fendants teach infringing capabilities to customers or users. For exam-
ple, a recent case found liability where licensees had received
guidance from the defendant as to how to use an infringing process.1 97
Another court found liability where a defendant provided a user man-
ual with a product that taught an infringing process.1 98 While these
192. See, e.g., MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d
1369, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Nat'l Instruments Corp. v. MathWorks, Inc., 113 F. App'x 895, 898
(Fed. Cir. 2004); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Rockwood Pigments, Inc. v. Axel J., LP, 53 F. App'x 917, 921 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Moleculon Res.
Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd. v. Abbott Labs.,
Nos. 04 C 8078, 05 C 1490, slip op., 2005 WL 3050608, at *23 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2005); Corning
Inc. v. SRU Biosystems, L.L.C., 400 F. Supp. 2d 653, 666 (D. Del. 2005); Superior Merch. Co. v.
M.G.I. Wholesale, Inc., Nos. Civ.A. 98-3174, Civ.A. 99-3492, 2000 WL 322779, at *13 (E.D. La.
Mar. 27, 2000); Oak Indus., Inc., v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 726 F. Supp. 1525, 1542-43 (N.D. Ill.
1989).
193. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780 (2005).
194. No. Civ.A.05-CV-4708, slip op., 2005 WL 3008894, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2005).
195. See, e.g., Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., L.L.C., 350 F.3d 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2003); Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 84 F.3d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
196. See, e.g., Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
197. Insituform Tech, Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
198. Corning Inc. v. SRU Biosystems, L.L.C., 400 F. Supp. 2d 653, 666 (D. Del. 2005).
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cases involve clear aiding on behalf of the defendant, courts have also
found liability for assistance that was less overt. For example, in Mc-
Kesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc., the court
suggested that liability could be found where a defendant set up an
infringing product for a customer and provided subsequent mainte-
nance.1 99 Courts have also considered evidence that defendants pro-
vided tech support to users, despite the Grokster Court's statements
that such ordinary acts will not indicate intent to induce infringe-
ment.200 These holdings seem to lower the level of required affirma-
tive conduct and approach a finding that providing an infringing
product itself can be inducement. Along those lines, the Federal Cir-
cuit recently stated that by designing a product capable of infringing
use and by anticipating that it may be used in that infringing manner,
the defendant could be liable for inducing infringement. 20 1
It will be important for courts to carve out definitions as to what
sorts of conduct will lead to liability for inducing infringement of cop-
yright. Many patent cases deal with defendants who provide instruc-
tions on how to use infringing products, how to modify them in ways
that infringe, or how to perform a patented process.20 2 The Grokster
Court seemingly recognized that defendants in copyright cases could
provide similar instructions, but whether infringement occurs depends
on how the user utilizes the product or process, as opposed to simply
utilizing the product or process itself. The distinction is important,
and indicates that courts may need to be careful when determining
what conduct gives rise to liability in patent cases versus copyright
cases.
But there are definite limits as to what conduct constitutes induce-
ment. Section 271(b) requires "active" inducement, and the Federal
Circuit has accordingly held that to be liable a defendant must engage
in some affirmative conduct, not merely standby and allow infringe-
ment to occur.203 In addition, a mere business relationship, even if
199. No. CIV S-02-2669 FCDKJM, slip op., 2005 WL 2346919, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2005).
200. See, e.g., MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d
1369, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the defendant provided tech support to the direct in-
fringer and required suppliers to do the same).
201. Cross Med. Prod., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2005). The principle comes dangerously close to allowing § 271(b) to swallow § 271(c) and the
substantial, non-infringing use to shield against liability for the mere selling of a product. The
court in Cross Medical, however, was ruling only on a motion for summary judgment and also
had before it further affirmative conduct on the part of the defendant. Id.
202. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
203. Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co., 248 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Beverly Hills
Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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that relationship is substantial, will not alone give rise to liability.204
Control over a subsidiary or employee may be a predicate for liability
in certain circumstances. 20 5 Some courts, however, have found that
selling a product itself can result in inducement liability.20 6 The Fed-
eral Circuit has been careful to reconcile these holdings with the Sony
shield 20 7 to ensure that § 271(b) will not create liability for the sale of
products that have substantial noninfringing uses. 20 8 The Grokster
opinion again speaks to this issue, and it seems clear that inducement
requires something more than merely selling a product with infringing
uses.209 Yet, liability is more likely where a defendant continues sell-
ing a product that it knows to be infringing.210 These cases may indi-
cate a willingness on behalf of courts to take a "sliding scale"
approach to inducement liability.211 Less "active" conduct will lead to
liability where the intent to induce infringement is clear, and vice
versa. Professor Lemley believes that this approach could reconcile
the differences within the case law regarding the requisite intent for
inducement.212
2. When Does a Party Intend to Induce Infringement?
The Federal Circuit continues to recognize that there is a "lack of
clarity" on the appropriate level of intent for inducement liability. 213
On one hand, it held "that proof of actual intent to cause the acts
which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to find-
204. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
205. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. JSP Footwear, Inc., 104 F. App'x 721, 724 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Water Techs.
Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
206. See, e.g., EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 542 (S.D. Ohio
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 755 F.2d 898 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding no evidence of promotion
by defendant, but finding liability where defendant sold a product knowing it would be used to
infringe).
207. As the Supreme Court described it, the Sony shield "limits imputing culpable intent as a
matter of law from the characteristics or uses of a distributed product." Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2779 (2005).
208. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("Espe-
cially where a product has substantial noninfringing uses, intent to induce infringement cannot
be inferred even when the defendant has actual knowledge that some users of its product may be
infringing the patent.").
209. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2781 n.12.
210. Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The defen-
dant continued selling refurbished products after they were found to infringe the plaintiff's pat-
ent in a previous International Trade Commission hearing. Id. See also Insituform Techs, Inc. v.
CAT Contracting Inc., 385 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
211. See Lemley, supra note 184, at 243.
212. Id. See also infra notes 255-257 and accompanying text.
213. Insituform, 385 F.3d at 1378; see also Fuji Photo Film, 394 F.3d at 1377.
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ing active inducement. ' 214 On the other hand, it stated that the plain-
tiff must show "that the alleged infringer's actions induced infringing
acts and that he knew or should have known his actions would induce
actual infringement[ ].,,215 At this point, it remains uncertain whether
an alleged inducer must intend to induce infringement, or must only
intend to induce the acts that lead to infringement.
Evidence of intent in inducement cases can come in many forms,
but courts weigh most heavily evidence that indicates that the defen-
dant was aware of the patent before he took action. For example, in
recent Federal Circuit cases the court found it important that the de-
fendant had sought a license from the plaintiff, and in one instance
had done so twice.216 In general, "[w]hile proof of intent is necessary,
direct evidence is not required; rather, circumstantial evidence may
suffice. ' 217 Courts have interpreted § 271(b) to require more than just
willful blindness, 21 8 but a "specific intent and action to induce in-
fringement ..."..1,219
Courts disagree, however, as to exactly what specific intent is re-
quired. In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., the defendant
Bausch & Lomb manufactured an infringing product within a division
that it later sold to a third party. 220 As part of the sale, it indemnified
the buyer against liability for patent infringement. 221 Hewlett-Pack-
ard subsequently sued Bausch & Lomb for inducing infringement by
the buyer.2 22 The court required proof from the plaintiff only that
Bausch & Lomb intended to cause the acts that constituted infringe-
ment.223 It did not require the defendant to be aware of the patent or
intend to infringe it despite the fact that the defendant did know of
the patent and had indemnified Bausch & Lomb against liability.224
Ironically, the court felt even this lower standard was not met.22 5
214. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing
Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
215. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
216. Fuji Photo Film, 394 F.3d at 1378 (twice seeking a license); Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med.
Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
217. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Water
Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
218. Id. at 1364 ("[Mlere knowledge of possible infringement by others does not amount to
inducement .
219. Id.
220. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1469.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1470.
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In Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., the defendant
corporate secretary obtained a drawing of the plaintiff's patented de-
vice.2 26 He gave the drawing to the company's president, who then
gave it to one of the defendant's designers in order to create an in-
fringing product.227 The plaintiff sued both officers for inducement,
but the claim failed after the plaintiff could not satisfy the Manville
Sales court's higher standard of intent.228 The court required the
plaintiff to prove that the officers were aware of the patent and in-
tended to infringe it.229 The officers never knew of the existence of
the patent until they were sued, at which point they received advice of
counsel that the new product did not infringe.2 30 The court held that
where the defendants did not know of the patent, and later had a good
faith belief that there was no infringement, there can be no induce-
ment liability.231 The holding attempted to draw the line between
mere knowledge and intent, stating that "[it must be established that
the defendant possessed specific intent to encourage another's in-
fringement and not merely that the defendant had knowledge of the
acts alleged to constitute inducement. '" 232
As mentioned, the Federal Circuit's most recent guidance on this
issue was to simply acknowledge a "lack of clarity" as to the proper
standard. 233 Meanwhile, courts have done their best to deal with the
situation on their own. The vast majority of cases tend to lean to-
wards the Manville Sales approach and require defendants to intend
the legal consequence of their actions-to intend to induce actual in-
fringement.2 34 Some courts, however, have adhered to the Hewlett-
226. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 553-54.
229. Id. at 553.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 553-54.
232. Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 553.
233. Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In-
situform Techs, Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
234. See, e.g., Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., L.L.C., 350 F.3d 1327, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Minne-
sota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Rockwood
Pigments, Inc. v. Axel J., LP, 53 F. App'x 917, 921 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great
Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc.,
84 F.3d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Globespanvirata, Inc. v. Texas Instrument, Inc., No. Civ. 03-2854
GEB, slip op., 2005 WL 3077915, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2005); McKesson Info Solutions, Inc. v.
Bridge Med., Inc., No. CIV. S-02-2669, slip op., 2005 WL 2346919, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2005); Techtronic Indus. Co. v. Chervon Holdings Ltd., No. 05-C-4370, 2005 WL 2563015 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 6, 2005); Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd. v. Abbott Labs., Nos. 04 C 8078, 05 C 1490, slip op., 2005
WL 3050608 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2005); TV Interactive Data Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C 02
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Packard standard,235 while still other courts have attempted to craft
new standards, such as looking for negligence on behalf of the defen-
dant as to whether its actions would induce infringement. 236 Finally,
some courts have required both actual intent to induce the infringing
acts, and knowledge of the infringement. 237 Those holdings may be
explained by a recent case that stated that where a defendant has
knowledge of the patent and it is shown that he intended to induce the
specific acts that led to infringement, then it will be presumed that the
defendant additionally intended to cause infringement. 238 How the
overall conflict will be resolved remains unclear, but it can be noted
that most recent district court cases appear to favor the Manville Sales
approach.239 At the very least, the Federal Circuit held that "a paten-
tee must be able to demonstrate at least that the alleged inducer had
knowledge of the infringing acts in order to demonstrate either level
of intent. '' 240 The Federal Circuit declined to resolve the dispute in
recent cases, instead finding the result to be clear regardless of which
standard is applied.241
02385 JSW, slip op., 2005 WL 1910929 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2005); Trustees of Columbia Univ. v.
Roche Diagnostics Gmbh, 150 F. Supp. 2d 191, 205 (D. Mass. 2001); Amersham Pharmacia Bi-
otech, Inc. v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., No. C 97-04203 CRB, 2000 WL 1897300, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
22, 2000); Mickowski v. Visi-Trak Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 171, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Quantum
Group Inc. v. Am. Sensor Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1442 (N.D. 11. 1998); L.A. Gear, Inc.
v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (C.D. Cal. 1994); Dynamis, Inc. v. Leepoxy Plas-
tics, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ind. 1993).
235. See, e.g., Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Kim v. Conagra Foods, Inc., No. 01-C-2467, 2003 WL 21222266, at *4 (N.D. Il. 2003); Hilgraeve,
Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d 613, 616-20 (E.D. Mich. 2003); CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc.
v. Tura LP, 905 F. Supp. 1171, 1195-96 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 112 F.3d 1146
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Maxwell v. Kmart Corp., 851 F. Supp. 1343, 1349 (D. Minn. 1994); FMT Corp.,
Inc. v. Nissei ASB Co., No. 1:90-cv-786-GET, 1991 WL 541113, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 22, 1991).
236. Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Symbol
Techs., Inc. v. Metrologic Instruments, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1390 (D.N.J. 1991). See also Lemley,
supra note 184, 241 & n.72.
237. See, e.g., Micro Chemical, 194 F.3d 1250; see also Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d 1348; see
Lemley, supra note 184, at 240-41.
238. See MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silison Corp., 420 F.3d. 1369,
1378 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The court was then careful to say that indemnification clauses in sales
contracts will not lead to a presumption of knowledge or intent to induce, unless the "primary
purpose is to overcome the deterrent effect that the patent laws have on would-be infringers."
Id. (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1990))
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also nCube Corp. v. Seachange Intern., Inc., 436 F.3d
1317, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Aventis Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 490, 515
(D.N.J. 2006).
239. See supra notes 226-234 and accompanying text.
240. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
241. See, e.g., Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1365 n.4 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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B. Finding a Common Ground Between Patents and Copyrights
The Grokster case seems to mimic the recent Federal Circuit cases,
and had the Court addressed the intent issue it likely would have
found the necessary intent under either standard. The evidence in
Grokster indicated that the defendants corresponded with users by
providing explicit examples of how to download and use copyrighted
materials. 242 It also showed that the defendants intended to entice
users it knew to be looking for copyrighted material. 243 Under the
specific facts of Grokster, the distinction between Manville Sales and
Hewlett-Packard is unlikely to be material.
That may not always be the case however. A closer look at Grok-
ster can show how easily the analysis of intent to induce infringement
can make the same issues surrounding the Sony shield relevant. For
all the comparisons made in Grokster between the software's infring-
ing versus noninfringing uses, the difference between the two is only
in the content the user actually downloads. 244 The acts taken by the
user to obtain that content do not differ in any material way. So what
if the defendants in Grokster had not specifically mentioned Napster
users, mentioned downloading of copyrighted material, or used copy-
righted material as examples in their explanations of the software's
use? What if they had merely shown users how to download content
and then left it up to the users to choose which content to download?
Presumably, the Court would not have found intent to induce in those
circumstances, but that is not made clear.
In such an instance, the intent standard that the court chooses could
become extremely important. If a plaintiff need only show that the
defendant intended to induce the act that led to infringement, rather
than actually induce infringement, then by merely showing users how
to use the Grokster and StreamCast software to download music, the
necessary intent would be present. On the other hand, if actual intent
to induce infringement is necessary, then plaintiffs will have to show
that defendants specifically intended for users of their software to
download copyrighted material.
In Grokster, the facts were such that this potential issue was imma-
terial. Future defendants, however, are sure to be more careful in
choosing their promotional materials and business strategies, and so
242. See supra notes 130-141 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 133-134, 144 and accompanying text.
244. For example, a user searching "Shakespeare" may get search results that include both
public domain works by the historically famous author and videos of the copyrighted film Shake-
speare in Love. Whether that particular user steals a copyrighted work depends only on which
file he or she subsequently chooses to download.
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the evidentiary issue may not always be so easy. While the Court
clearly stated that the Sony safe harbor should not be engulfed by the
theory of inducing infringement of copyright, 245 the threat of that hap-
pening is certainly present. For this reason, in situations like Grokster,
where a product's noninfringing versus infringing uses require virtu-
ally identical actions on behalf of the actual user, courts should be
careful to ensure that the evidence shows a defendant actually in-
tended to encourage users to infringe copyright as opposed to merely
showing that the defendant explained a usage of the product which
the user independently used to infringe.
In addition, the distinction between the two standards is important
in making sure that the new inducing infringement of copyright theory
does not swallow the still-standing Sony shield. Future scenarios like
Grokster may arise where the overwhelming majority of a product's
users are implementing the product in an infringing fashion. In such
situations, a difficult scenario may face software distributors, who will
know that every time their software is downloaded or installed, in-
fringement is likely to result. Under Manville Sales, such a distributor
is not liable absent a showing of "clear expression or other affirmative
steps taken" to induce that infringement. 246 Under the Hewlett-Pack-
ard standard, however, the act of selling the product itself could be
considered inducement where a defendant becomes nearly certain
that future users will infringe, regardless of any noninfringing uses.
The result is a distributor's inability to sell its product regardless of
any lawful potential. While Grokster does not specifically require evi-
dence beyond the mere sale of a product, courts should recognize the
potential pitfall and refuse to interpret it in that way.
The results so far send mixed signals. In Monotype Imaging, Judge
St. Eve did not reference the open issue of necessary intent for in-
ducement liability in patent law. Instead, she focused her analysis on
the types of evidence the Supreme Court set forth in Grokster.247 But
Judge St. Eve explicitly rejected the argument that intent could be
imputed from knowledge of infringing acts, suggesting a standard in
line with that set forth in Manville Sales.248 In AMC Technology, how-
ever, where the defendant was charged with inducement due to the
distribution of instructions on upgrading a product, the court held that
the act of distributing the guide showed intent to induce infringement
245. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 226-232 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 162-170 and accompanying text.
248. Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877, 889 & n.13 (N.D. Ill.
2005).
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because the defendant knew it did not have the right to copy the
plaintiff's code when it instructed users how to do so.249 The holding
is analogous to the approach taken by the court in MEMC Electron-
ics.250 It suggests that courts will impute knowledge of infringement
where a party intends to induce acts that result in direct infringement
and when that party is aware of the applicable copyright. This holding
brings us closer to the danger zone mentioned above.251
Despite the potential for multiple readings of the Grokster opinion,
it seems probable that courts Will require a showing of intent beyond
the mere selling of a product where infringing use is likely. A con-
trary ruling would render meaningless the Court's requirement of evi-
dence showing "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken
... 252 Most of the evidence cited by the Court goes to intent, as
opposed to focusing on the conduct itself.253 Furthermore, the first
case applying the Grokster opinion rejects the proffered evidence as
an insufficient showing of intent, refusing to impute the intent merely
from conduct alone.254
C. Sliding Scale
One effective way to bring clarity and stability to this issue would
be to take a sliding scale approach to analyze evidence of inducement
against a defendant. Professor Lemley offered this approach as a so-
lution to the discrepancy within the Federal Circuit between the hold-
ings in Manville Sales and Hewlett-Packard.25 5 He said that where the
defendant is shown to have a greater involvement in the infringing
acts of the direct infringer, then courts should require a less stringent
showing of intent.256 On the other hand, where the defendant plays
less of a role in the infringement, the courts should require a stronger
showing of intent to induce infringement before finding liability.257
In effect, this approach would reconcile the holdings in Manville
Sales and Hewlett-Packard, and potentially clarify the Court's holding
in Grokster. While the Court did not explicitly require a showing of
249. AMC Tech., L.L.C. v. SAP AG, No. Civ.A.05-CV-4708, slip op., 2005 WL 3008894, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2005).
250. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
252. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770 (2005) (em-
phasis added).
253. See supra notes 142-161 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 162-171 and accompanying text.
255. See Lemley, supra note 184, at 241-46.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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advertisement or promotion of infringing uses beyond the mere sale
of the product, it weighed that evidence most heavily. A sliding scale
interpretation says that because it is the users who have searched for
and downloaded the copyrighted material, a strong showing of the ser-
vice providers intent to induce is necessary to hold the provider liable.
In a case like Monotype Imaging, the evidence of intent was insuffi-
cient for liability when taken in context with the defendant's involve-
ment. Accordingly, Professor Lemley's sliding scale approach to
inducement liability is a good fit for both patent and copyright law.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court's decision may or may not mark the end
of the Grokster saga,258 it clearly changed the legal landscape in the
battle between copyright owners and technology providers by giving
copyright owners a new avenue with which to pursue liability.259 This
new theory focuses not on the technology at issue, nor on the defen-
dant's knowledge or control, but on whether the provider, through
"clear expression or other affirmative steps taken," induced its users
to infringe copyright. 260 By dipping into patent law to give copyright
owners this new weapon, the Court likely triggered a merge between
the two bodies of law on the subject of inducement. 261 As a result,
courts will be charged with applying the law in a way that gives clarity
to potential litigants, and maintains the longstanding protection the
Court provided to technology distributors in Sony.262 One way to do
so is to adopt a sliding scale approach when analyzing a defendant's
intent and affirmative conduct.263
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